Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023. — 88 p.
Causes always seem to come prior to their effects. What might explain this asymmetry? Causation's temporal asymmetry isn't straightforwardly due to a temporal asymmetry in the laws of nature—the laws are, by and large, temporally symmetric. Nor does the asymmetry appear due to an asymmetry in time itself. This Element examines recent empirical attempts to explain the temporal asymmetry of causation: statistical mechanical accounts, agency accounts and fork asymmetry accounts. None of these accounts are complete yet and a full explanation of the temporal asymmetry of causation will likely require contributions from all three programs.
Introduction
What Is the Temporal Asymmetry of Causation?
What Might Explain the Temporal Asymmetry of Causation?
Russell’s Challenge
Russell’s First Argument
Russell’s Second Argument
Russell’s Third Argument
The Role of Causation
Statistical Mechanical Accounts
Lewis’ Counterfactual Account
Objections to Lewis’ Account
Albert’s and Loewer’s Accounts
Bells and Whistles
Objection 1: Causation in All Settings
Objection 2: Backwards Counterfactual Dependence
The Role of Agency
Agency Accounts
The Core of Agency Accounts
What Are Causal Relations?
Explaining the Temporal Asymmetry of Causation
Objections to Price’s Explanation
The Tickle-Defence Explanation
Evaluating the Tickle-Defence Explanation
Future Directions
Reconciling Statistical Mechanical and Agency Accounts
Fork Asymmetry Accounts
Conclusion
References
Acknowledgements